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Multi-Central Differential Privacy
Thomas Steinke∗
Abstract
Differential privacy is typically studied in the central model where a trusted “aggregator”
holds the sensitive data of all the individuals and is responsible for protecting their privacy. A
popular alternative is the local model in which the aggregator is untrusted and instead each
individual is responsible for their own privacy. The decentralized privacy guarantee of the local
model comes at a high price in statistical utility or computational complexity. Thus intermediate
models such as the shuffled model and pan privacy have been studied in an attempt to attain
the best of both worlds.
In this note, we propose an intermediate trust model for differential privacy, which we call
the multi-central model. Here there are multiple aggregators and we only assume that they do
not collude nefariously. This model relaxes the trust requirements of the central model while
avoiding the price of the local model. We motivate this model and provide some simple and
efficient algorithms for it. We argue that this model is a promising direction for further research.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [DMNS06] is a formal standard for the protection of sensitive information
about individuals in data analysis. Informally, differential privacy ensures that we cannot infer
the attributes of any individual from the output of the algorithm. Differentially private algorithms
randomly distort their output enough to obscure an individual’s contribution – but, hopefully, not
too much, so that the output remains useful.
It is simplest to assume that the differentially private algorithm is executed by a trusted party
– the “aggregator” – that has access to all the data and only the final output is released. This
standard setup is referred to as the central model.
The central model requires individuals to trust the aggregator to securely store and process their
data, but such a universally trusted entity may not exist. Thus it is important to also consider
privacy threats arising from the computation process, rather than just the final output.
There are a few approaches for avoiding the need for a trusted aggregator:
• Local randomization: Certain algorithms, like randomized response [War65], perform the distor-
tion needed to guarantee differential privacy at the individual level, before the data is aggregated.
Since the individuals (or, rather, their personal devices) perform the distortion themselves, they
need not trust any other party. This is what is known as the local model of differential privacy
[KLNRS08].
The minimal trust requirements and scalable algorithms of local differential privacy make it
very attractive in practice. Google [EPK14], Apple [App16], and Microsoft [DKY17] have all
deployed locally differentially private systems with millions of users.
Unfortunately, algorithms in the local model are necessarily less accurate than their counterparts
in the central model [BNO08; KLNRS08; CSS12b; DJW18; Ull18; BNS18; DR18; JMNR19;
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JMR20]. Essentially, each individual must randomly distort their own data as much as a trusted
aggregator would distort the sum of everyone’s data. The variances of all these distortions add
up, resulting in much larger error being necessary in the local model than in the central model.
• Cryptography: Various works [DKMMN06; BNO08; SCRCS11; NH12; CSS12a; PL15; Bon+17;
GX17; Kai+19] have employed variants of secure multiparty computation (SMC) (a.k.a. secure
function evaluation) [Yao82; Yao86; GMW87; LP08] to simulate having a trusted aggregator
while only making trust assumptions akin to the local model. These tools typically provide a
computational differential privacy guarantee [MPRV09; MMPRTV10] – that is, we must make
an assumption about the computational abilities of a potential adversary.
However, these cryptographic protocols incur significant overheads. Building practical SMC
systems remains a significant research challenge [PSSW09; HKE13; CMTB16]. At this stage, it is
not feasible to scale SMC to thousands or millions of individuals who only have the computational
and communication resources (and reliability) of a personal computer or smartphone.
• Special assumptions: Intermediate trust models between the central model and the local model
have also been considered. These make some special-purpose assumption, with the goal of
striking a better balance between realistic privacy and statistical utility.
The pan-private model [DNPR10] assumes that the aggregator is trustworthy now, but may not
be trustworthy in the future. It requires the aggregator to only store distorted values, instead
of the raw data, to protect against future intrusions.
The shuffled model [CSUZZ19; EFMRTT19] assumes that there are many individuals honestly
participating in the protocol and that the aggregator receives their messages in an anonymous
manner – that is, the adversary does not know which message originated from which individual.
We propose another intermediate trust model between the central and local models and argue that
it attains the best of both worlds – a realistic trust model, accurate and practical algorithms, and,
of course, a rigorous privacy guarantee.
1.1 Our Model: Multi-Central Differential Privacy
We now specify the setup of our model and the guarantee of multi-central differential privacy.
There are m aggregators A1, · · · , Am and n individuals with private data x1, · · · , xn. The
individuals will communicate with the aggregators and the aggregators will communicate with one
another and, finally, produce some public output.
Our trust assumption is that the aggregators do not collude nefariously. That is, we assume that
at least one of the aggregators is trustworthy, but we do not know which one. More precisely, under
multi-central differential privacy, the adversary chooses m− 1 aggregators and n− 1 individuals to
control. The remaining individual to be protected and remaining trustworthy aggregator faithfully
follow the protocol. The view of the adversary consists of all the information available to the
aggregators it controls plus the final output of the trustworthy aggregator. It excludes only the
internal information of the trustworthy aggregator and the individual to be protected. Differential
privacy for the remaining individual’s data must be provided with respect to this view. That
is, the protocol is computationally (ε, δ)-differentially private in the multi-central model if, for
all trustworthy aggregators j ∈ [m] and all individuals i ∈ [n] to be protected and all datasets
x1, · · · , xn, x′i and all efficiently computable S,
P
[
ViewA1,··· ,Aj−1,output(Aj),Aj+1,··· ,Am(x1, · · · , xn) ∈ S
]
≤ eε·P
[
ViewA1,··· ,output(Aj),··· ,Am(x1, · · · , x′i, · · · , xn) ∈ S
]
+δ.
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We remark that the number of aggregators m can be viewed as a “trust parameter.” The
larger m is, the less reliant we are on trusting any individual aggregator. Setting m = 1 simply
recovers the usual central model, while m = n is analogous to the local model. The statistical or
computational cost of privacy also increases with m.
Note that this model does not guarantee utility in the presence of adversaries; utility may be
more easily compromised by a single malicious party than privacy.
1.2 Motivation
We envisage the m aggregators as being a handful of large data centers and the n individuals as
millions of people with smartphones or personal computers and all communication happening via
the internet using public-key cryptography. The final output can be freely shared.
We now suggest several scenarios in which our trust model is potentially realistic (or, at least,
may be more realistic than the central model).
• Insider/physical threats: A major concern when individuals allow their data to be stored and
processed in a data center is that an employee or someone who has gained physical access to the
servers will obtain their sensitive data.
The multi-central model protects against such insider threats, as long as no employee is granted
access to systems in all of the data centers. Likewise, a physical attacker would need to break
into all of the data centers to compromise the multi-central model.
• Multiple jurisdictions: Privacy laws are becoming increasingly complex and this is compounded
by the fact that data often crosses international borders. For example, the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR) restricts the transfer of private data abroad.
The multi-central model may help address some of these international legal challenges. If a data
center (and the relevant management) is placed in each applicable jurisdiction, then the data
could be protected under the laws of all of these jurisdictions. Bypassing multi-central differential
privacy and accessing the raw data in a legal fashion would presumably require adhering to the
privacy laws of all jurisdictions. Users may have increased confidence in the privacy protections
knowing that, in the event of a privacy breach, they potentially have legal recourse in multiple
courts.
• Trust as a Service: A trusted organization can be contracted to serve as one of the aggregators.
Thereby users need only trust that this organization follows the terms of its contract. In essence,
this organization is providing a “trust service”. Such a service would be useful for companies
that are not themselves fully trusted by users or have incentives to breach privacy.
• Collaborating Rivals: The multi-central model provides a framework for companies that are
usually fierce rivals to collaborate and, in the process, benefit the privacy of their users. In this
framework, the companies would each take the role of one aggregator and their user bases would
be combined for the purpose of data collection. Thereby the companies gain better statistical
accuracy from the larger combined user base. Furthermore, users’ privacy is protected by the
rivalry between companies. That is, the multi-central model protects the user data, as long as
we trust the companies to not collude to violate privacy.
• Honest but curious: The multi-central model protects against overly curious aggregators – since
each aggregator only sees the data in an indecipherable form, they are not tempted to explore
it.
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Needless to say, the multi-central model does not account for all possible threats. For example, it
is likely that the aggregators will share software or a hardware provider; if this common software or
hardware is compromised, then so too is the multi-central model. However, even local differential
privacy is vulnerable to compromised software or hardware at the user end. Additionally, if all
the aggregators belong to the same organization, then the leadership of that organization could
presumably violate the multi-central privacy protections. This is why it is preferrable to have the
aggregators belong to distinct organizations.
1.3 Related Work
We begin by noting that our proposed trust model is not novel. It has been widely studied, for
example, in private information retrieval [CGKS95] and secret sharing [Sha79; Bla79]. Indeed, we
seek to build upon these lines of work.
Furthermore, combining this trust model with differential privacy has been previously proposed
[CGB17]. However, to the best of our knowledge, this has not been seriously investigated. The
purpose of this note is to begin such an investigation and to encourage further work.
The multi-central trust model is, of course, closely related to the central, local, and shuffled
models. We briefly remark about how these compare. Clearly, any algorithm for the local model
can be run in the multi-central model and any algorithm in the multi-central model can be run in
the central model. This establishes the multi-central model as an intermediate trust model.
Also, the shuffled model can be simulated in the multi-central model – the aggregators must
simply perform the shuffling of messages. Thus our model subsumes the functionality of the shuffled
model.
Using secure multiparty computation, it is possible to simulate the central model in the multi-
central model (with a computational differential privacy guarantee). Unfortunately, secure multi-
party computation is not yet practical for general-purpose computations. Nonetheless, this estab-
lishes that there is no inherent ceiling to the potential of algorithms the multi-central model model.
The only limitation to the multi-central model is our ability to devise and execute algorithms and
the limits that would be present even in the central model.
In the rest of this note, we explore some algorithms for the multi-central model. We believe
these demonstrate that the multi-central model warrants further (empirical) exploration.
2 Algorithms
Having introduced and motivated the multi-central model, we now turn to demonstrating its utility
by proposing several simple, accurate, and efficient private algorithms.
2.1 Counting Queries
Counting queries are a particularly simple and fundamental task. Namely, given q : X → {0, 1},
the task is to privately approximate 1n
∑n
i=1 q(xi), where the private data of the individuals is
x1, · · · , xn ∈ X . Our algorithm for this task is also simple and is based on a linear secret sharing
scheme [Sha79; Bla79].
Choose a modulus p > n. Each individual i ∈ [n] generates independent uniformly random
values v1i , · · · , vm−1i ∈ Zp and sets vmi = q(xi) −
∑m−1
j=1 v
j
i mod p. Then v
j
i is transmitted to Aj
(using public-key cryptography) for each j ∈ [m].
If the aggregators where to combine all their values, they can recover q(xi) =
∑m
j=1 v
j
i . However,
any m−1 aggregators see only uniformly random values and have no information about q(xi). This
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is the security property of the secret sharing scheme and the basis of the multi-central differential
privacy guarantee.
In the protocol, each aggregator j ∈ [m] computes vj = ∑ni=1 vji and outputs a noisy sample
V j ← N (vj , σ2) from the continuous or discrete Gaussian [CKS20]. The addition of noise ensures
multi-central (ρ = 1/2σ2)-concentrated differential privacy [BS16], which entails multi-central (ε =
1/2σ2 +
√
2 log(1/δ)/σ2 , δ)-differential privacy [DKMMN06] for all δ > 0.
The final output is
∑m
j=1 V
j mod p
n , which is distributed as N
(
1
n
∑n
i=1 q(xi),
m·σ2
n2
)
mod pn . As-
suming p≫ n andm·σ2 ≪ n2, this value will be close to the desired value. The accuracy guarantee
degrades as m gets larger. We note that m = 1 recovers the accuracy guarantee obtainable in the
central model and m = n recovers the accuracy guarantee obtainable in the local model.
This algorithm is also very efficient. Each individual must transmit O(log p) = O(log n) bits per
aggregator in one round. The main computational task is encrypting the messages for transmission.
The aggregators must simply decrypt the values and add them up along with some noise.
2.2 Heavy Hitters
Identifying heavy hitters is a well-studied and important task in differential privacy, particularly in
the local model [MS06; HKR12; EPK14; BS15; App16; QYYKXR16; BST17; BNS18]. The key task
is to be able to privately estimate the frequency within the dataset of any element. (Sophisticated
reductions on top of such a frequency estimator can then be used to find the frequent elements.)
We can efficiently construct a frequency estimator for multi-central differential privacy using
the previous algorithm for statistical queries combined with linear sketching, such as the Johnson-
Lindenstrauss transform. In particular, our algorithm produces a sketch subject to multi-central
(ρ = 12ε
2)-concentrated differential privacy [BS16] which can be used to estimate the frequency of
any element with additive relative error α = O
(√
m log(1/β)
εn +
√
log(1/β)
ℓ
)
, where β is the allowed
failure probability and ℓ is the size of the sketch. Each individual must send O(ℓ · log n) bits to
each aggregator. (The algorithm also requires O(log |X | · log(1/β)) bits of shared randomness for
the sketch [CW09, Thm. 2.2], where X is the data universe.) Multiple queries can be answered
using the same sketch.
For m = O(1), this provides utility comparable to the central model.
2.3 Computationally-Secure Secret Sharing & Decision Trees
The previous two algorithms use information-theoretic secret sharing. However, we can reduce
the communication in some settings by using computational function secret sharing. Boyle et al.
[BGI15; BGI16] (see also [WYGVZ17; Wan18]) show how to secret share any family of queries repre-
sented by a decision tree of size ℓ with secret shares of size O(λ·ℓ), where λ is the security parameter
(i.e., key length). These constructions are very efficient and only use symmetric-key cryptography
(specifically, pseudorandom generators), rather than more exotic cryptographic primitives.
This yields an efficient algorithm in the multi-central model for threshold queries [DNPR10;
BNSV15] over domain X ⊂ R, which can be computed by a decision tree of size ℓ = O(log |X |).
This also yields an alternative frequency estimation algorithm for heavy hitters in which the share
size and, hence, communication per aggregator is O(λ ·min{log |X |, log(1/αβ)}) bits, rather than
O(log(n) · log(1/β)/α2) as above. This is a significant improvement in the high accuracy (small α)
regime.
More generally, function secret sharing can be used to significantly reduce communication in the
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multi-central model. Answers to a structured family of queries (e.g., thresholds) can be compressed.
However, compression is possible even in unstructured settings: For example, suppose we need to
answer k arbitrary counting queries. If we use the information-theoretic secret sharing algorithm
above k times, then the communication will grow linearly in k, which could be prohibitive. However,
it is possible to instead have each individual pick one out of the k queries at random and only
answer that one. Function secret sharing allows the individual to transmit this single answer
to the aggregators without the aggregators learning which query was answered and, crucially, the
communication grows only logarithmically in k. Effectively, the individual sends a vector of answers
where at most one entry is nonzero and this can be compressed. This approach introduces some
statistical noise due to sampling, but, depending on the parameters, should still provide sufficiently
accurate answers. In terms of privacy, each query answer should be privatized as before, but, since
the adversary does not know which query the individual chose to answer, their privacy is amplified
[CSUZZ19; EFMRTT19] and the final guarantee is comparable to that of the less efficient algorithm.
2.4 Secure Multiparty Computation & Selection
A general-purpose tool for the multi-central model is secure multiparty computation (SMC). The
individuals can use a simple secret sharing scheme to send their data to the aggregators, who can
then use SMC to compute the desired differentially private output as if they were a single trusted
aggregator. This protocol is very efficient for the individuals and allows a rich set of analyses to
be run, but may be computationally expensive for the aggregators (although not as expensive as
including all individuals in the SMC protocol).
The practicality of the SMC will depend on the task being run. One important task is selection
– given a dataset x and a set of (counting) queries q1, q2, · · · , qk, we wish to privately output some
approximation to argmax
ℓ∈[k]
qℓ(x). The classic algorithm for selection is the exponential mechanism
[MT07]. An alternative is the report-noisy-max algorithm [DR14], which outputs argmax
ℓ∈[k]
qℓ(x)+ξℓ,
where ξ1, · · · , ξk are independent Laplace noise scaled to the global sensitivity of the queries. We
can implement a variant of report-noisy-max in the multi-central model using fairly limited SMC
as follows.
First, every individual i ∈ [n] computes secret shares vi,j,ℓ ∈ Zp such that
∑
j∈[m] vi,j,ℓ = qℓ(xi)
mod p for all ℓ ∈ [k]. Each vi,j,ℓ is then sent to aggregator j. Each aggregator j ∈ [m] computes
vˆj,ℓ :=
∑
i∈[n] vi,j,ℓ + ξj,ℓ mod p, where ξj,ℓ is (discrete) Laplace noise [CKS20]. Finally, SMC is
used to compute
ℓ∗ := argmax
ℓ∈[k]

∑
j∈[m]
vˆj,ℓ mod p


and the value ℓ∗ is released. This is differentially private as long as the SMC only reveals the argmax
and the adversary does not know the noise added by at least one of the aggregators. The utility is
also comparable to that of the exponential mechanism, as long as the number of aggregators m is
small. In terms of computation, the SMC must only compute the modular sum and the argmax.
There is hope that this special-purpose task can be performed practically, but further investigation
is needed.
We remark that efficient selection is believed to not be possible in the shuffled model [CSUZZ19;
GGKPV19]. Thus this suggests a possible advantage of the multi-central model. Selection is an
important tool, and is a critical subroutine in more complex systems [HR10]. Implementing selection
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will allow other things to be built on top of it.
3 Conclusion and Further Work
This note motivates the study of the multi-central model of differential privacy and proposes several
basic algorithms for the model. We hope that this motivates and serves as a basis for further
exploration, including experimental evaluations.
We hope to develop more algorithms, guarantee accuracy in the presence of faults (using tools
like verifiable secret sharing [CGMA85; CGB17]), and also explore other trust models.
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